Iran Nuclear Deal 2.0: Can it Be Saved?

After a four-month delay, the lead negotiator for Iran’s nuclear deal, Ali Bagheri, announced that talks will resume on November 29. His tweet represents a small step towards the successful completion of an agreement between Iran and P5+1 countries (comprised of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany). Earlier this year, the Biden administration announced America’s potential re-entry into negotiations. However, the future of the deal has stood barricaded by Trump’s withdrawal in 2018, America’s reinstatement of economic sanctions, and Iran’s noncompliance since. At this point, the fate of the deal, as well as Iranian relations with the US and the rest of the world, remain unclear.

Known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this deal is not the first of its kind agreed to by Iran. In its signature to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, Iran promised to abandon any plans to develop nuclear weapons. The overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 changed circumstances surrounding the treaty; however, Iranian leaders created secret facilities to explore and develop nuclear technology. Although Iran continues to insist that its nuclear program is and has always been exclusively peaceful, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports from 2003 indicate an inability to confirm these declarations decisively. According to former US President Obama, the 2009 discovery of an additional secret facility designed for 3,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges was “not consistent with a peaceful nuclear program.” The suspicions of the P5+1 states precipitated the initial implementation of tough economic sanctions on Iran. 

Obama initially formulated the JCPOA with Iran and other P5+1 states. After years of unsuccessful negotiations, the 2013 election of reformer President Hassan Rouhani in Iran shed a light of hope into the dark tunnel of rejected offerings. President Rouhani agreed to cooperate with the leaders of P5+1 states to reach a comprehensive deal. JCPOA’s main goal consisted of devolving Iran’s nuclear program and increasing the country’s “breakout time” to at least a period of one year. In 2015, Iran agreed to restrictions on plutonium and uranium enrichment, limits on stockpiles of nuclear weapons materials, the regulation of centrifuges, and the acceptance of routine inspections from the IAEA. In return, Iran benefitted from the removal of detrimental economic sanctions and the end of the UN’s ban on Iran’s transfer of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, to be lifted after five years and only if the IAEA confirmed that Iran’s nuclear program be entirely peaceful. JCPOA went into effect in January of 2016.

In May of 2018, the Trump administration withdrew from Iran’s nuclear deal on account of its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and Iranian sponsorship of terrorist groups in the region. Trump also reinstated harsh banking and oil sanctions. To keep JCPOA alive, other P5+1 countries continued to import Iranian oil using Trump-approved waivers; because of this, Iran continued to follow its promises listed in the agreement. However, the US later halted the approval of these waivers, and Iran’s behaviour changed.

Tensions have escalated since these events via American and Israeli provocations and Iran’s explicit violations of the JCPOA. The nuclear deal detailed Iran’s promise to limit uranium enrichment, a production process necessary for the development of nuclear fuel. In January of 2020, the US killed a top Iranian general, Qasem Soleimani during a Baghdad airstrike. In response, Iran completely dissolved its limits on uranium enrichment and began reconstruction of a centrifuge production center previously destroyed in an attack allegedly perpetrated by Israel. In November, the assassination of a prominent Iranian nuclear scientist induced the Iranian parliament to pass a law permitting a boost in uranium enrichment to 60% (up from 20% after Trump reintroduced sanctions and 3.67% since the JCPOA agreement). Iran also suspects Israel to be responsible for this attack. Iran subsequently ended its acceptance of JCPOA requirements by abandoning its agreement with the IAEA. In April of this year, following the sabotage of its Natanz facility, Iran started enrichment at 60%.

Since the US and other Western states boast impressive nuclear arsenals of their own, one might wonder why Iran’s pursuit of a modest nuclear program is a pressing concern for P5+1 countries. America’s fears of a nuclear Iran stem from the perceived security danger to the US and its greatest ally in the Middle East, Israel. America’s other Arab allies, including Bahrain and the UAE, are also concerned about Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons and the risk of destabilization in the region. The US also considers Iran a leading state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s foreign policy backed by nuclear power has the potential of a likely increase of aggression through Iran’s deep involvement in Syria, its support of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and its sponsorship of rebel insurgencies in Yemen.

Iran’s desire to become a nuclear state threatens other nations in the Middle East. As a region already tense with conflict, P5+1 countries fear that Iran’s successful pursuit of nuclear weapons may provoke rival states Israel and Saudi Arabia to retaliate, causing further hostility. More specifically, Israel has taken preventative military action against suspected nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria; a repeat of this trend, in this case, could incite retaliation from Hezbollah in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia has also indicated intentions to build a nuclear program in the event of a successful Iranian program. A new military position for Iran could trigger a nuclear arms race in an already unstable region. Such instability would be disastrous; any delays or disruptions it may have on the Persian Gulf’s steady oil transport channels, such as through an internal OPEC price war, would constitute a cataclysmic hit to the oil market, a vital and volatile component of the global economy.

Trump’s halt of sanction waivers on oil exports and the reinstatement of US sanctions have deeply wounded the Iranian economy, as oil and petroleum products account for 80% of Iran’s exports. In addition, US-imposed sanctions on Iranian banks caused a severe depreciation in the Rial’s currency value. Iran may see similar hardships including recessionary and inflationary pressures,  inducing Iranian compliance in a new deal. 

At this point, JCPOA negotiations have stalemated – five months have passed since the sixth round of the Vienna talks in June. During this period, Iran has continued to accelerate its nuclear program. A frustrated US State Secretary Anthony Blinken has begun considering plan B options. The key points of contention involve sequencing and long-term assurances of protection. Tehran is waiting on Washington’s move and expects the lifting of sanctions to occur before it agrees to any compliance. During a speech at the UN, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisini blamed the US for leaving the nuclear deal and stated that the US should meet its obligations first. With regards to long-term protection, Iran requires the creation of a system to protect its economy in the event of another JCPOA withdrawal shock. On this matter, the Biden administration is unsure of its own ability to stay in the JCPOA during this term and is not in a position to promise anything on behalf of a future administration.

Despite these difficulties, Biden’s continued persistence to meet with Iran and discuss a new deal shows promise. America’s fear of a nuclear Iran remains prominent, and the best deterrence to this threat is a reinstatement of the JCPOA. Similarly, Iran needs a new deal to mitigate a significantly weakened economy suffering under US sanctions. Tehran’s decision to set a date to return to Vienna, while only a first step, is still a positive sign. To avoid excess conflict in the region and to curb Iran’s rapidly accelerating nuclear program, they must form a new agreement as soon as possible.