New Year, New Middle East: The End of a Three-Year Blockade on Qatar

As the first month of the new year unfolded, the announcement of the end of the three-year land, air and sea blockade on Qatar previously imposed by four major Arab states came as a surprise to the world. The conflicting states decided, at last, to put their differences aside to restore economic, diplomatic, and political relations, enhancing the region’s security. The tense situation created by the sudden blockade came as a shock to the region and the end of the rift will undoubtedly redefine regional dynamics.  

Egypt and the three Gulf States’ boycott against Qatar began in June 2017 due to claims of the nation’s support of terrorism and its worrying closeness with Iran, a long time rival of Sunni-led states. As conditions to end the embargo, the Gulf States provided Qatar with a list of 13 demands including the closure of Al-Jazeera, the decrease of diplomatic ties with Iran, the shutdown of the Turkish military base, and an end to Qatar’s contacts with the Muslim brotherhood. Perceiving the blockade as a violation of international law and a threat to its national sovereignty, Qatar completely refused the allegations as well as the compliance to the set of demands. Qatar also deemed ending relations with its neighbour Iran as unreasonable; as their relationship purely focused on economic ends due to geographical proximity, rather than political means. Furthermore, Qatar’s acknowledgement of extending funds to some Islamist groups and denial of aiding jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda led to the closure of Qatar’s land border along with the ban of Qatari ships and Qatar Airways flights in most destinations in the region.

Many praised Qatar, an import-dependent state, for handling the crisis surprisingly well. Qatar rapidly established trade routes with the bloc’s regional rivals Turkey and Iran to ensure the basic needs of its 2.7 million population, while using its accumulated oil wealth to boost its economy. Following the implementation of the embargo, Qatar acted quickly to repatriate $20bn in foreign investments to keep its economy floating. The blockade on Qatar, aiming to worsen Qatar’s relations with Iran, contrarily produced the opposite result; Qatar deepened trade relations with the latter, relying on Iran’s airspace. Turkey, a state with rising influence in the region and a current ally of the Qatari state, showed its support by accelerating its deployment of troops in Doha. The United States, which usually plays a major role in Middle Eastern politics, also responded to the conflict by initially siding with Saudi Arabia, applauding the nation’s anti-terrorism efforts, but later took a more neutral stance to protect its regional interests and to possibly encourage the creation of a united block against Iran. 

As the end of 2020 neared, Kuwaiti and American mediators strongly increased their efforts in imposing pressures to stop the conflict. The Trump administration hoped to create an alliance of Sunni-led states against its long rival, Iran. On the run-up to the inauguration of Joe Biden, an alignment of interests slowly appeared, ending the three years of troubled economic cohesion in the Middle East. Some analysts attribute the resolution of the conflict to the Saudi state’s intentions of pleasing the incoming Biden administration, fearing the possibility of a less aggressive US foreign policy towards Iran. By signing off an accord to end the rift, the Saudi government also hoped for a united front against the state of Iran. At the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit (GCC) held earlier this month at Al Ula, the Saudi crown prince publicly embraced and welcomed the Emir of Qatar, symbolizing an end to the diplomatic crisis.  Shortly after the summit, Saudi Arabia and Qatar reopened their borders and resumed flights between their major cities. Expected to reopen soon, embassies will ease up a tense and historic period between the Gulf states. 

However, as the Gulf region goes back to square one, the lack of changes that came with the blockade on Qatar raised some questions on the sustainability of the resolution along with the effectiveness of the embargo. The Trump administration stated that Qatar agreed to solely drop its international lawsuits against the four Gulf States after the end of the blockade, including a case at the International Criminal Court in which Qatar insists that the embargo led to discrimination against Qataris. The counter-parties appeared pleased by the new decision, noting Qatar’s history of winning cases at international institutions. Additionally, analysts claim that the Qataris will not easily forget the blockade due to the damaging effects on the idea of Gulf and Arab unity. Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s minister of state, acknowledged the latter conflict and expressed Emiratis’ willingness to take the necessary steps to restore the confidence between the two states. Nevertheless, it seems quite unlikely that Qatar will fully restore its reliance on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could make the country vulnerable to another partial blockage in the future. 

Undoubtedly, the implementation of an embargo on Qatar had primarily negative economic and diplomatic consequences on all parties. Although the easing of the blockade and the reconciliation of the previous allies might not completely restore trust and hope for Arabic unity, it will still benefit the region by creating harmonious relationships in the Gulf and boosting regional economic activities. As the Biden administration takes office, with clearly different stands and values than the previous one and with rumors of a much less aggressive approach towards Iran, leaders of the Middle East wonder how decisions taken by the American president will shift the regional dynamics, yet again.