Deal or No Deal: The Effects of Iran-U.S. Rivalry on the Middle East

American presidential elections have historically been highly anticipated by Middle Eastern populations and leaders in the past decade, as election results determine highly influential American foreign policy approaches towards the area. Decisions of American leaders alter the balance of powers in the region, especially between two strong rivals: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Donald Trump’s four years in office undoubtedly affected Iran’s relationships in the Middle East; however, Democratic President Joe Biden is widely expected to proceed differently.  

The US has had a rocky relationship with Iran since the unfolding of the Islamic Revolution. Undoubtedly, the situation accelerated in the past decade. As soon as Trump entered the White House, he visited the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, and signed the United States’ biggest arms deal in modern history, signaling to the world the beginning of a strong alliance between the two states. Trump’s subsequent actions demonstrated that he vowed to make Iran pay for its political and military actions in the area while providing unconditional support to Saudi Arabia. 

Shortly thereafter, the United States swiftly terminated the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran and implemented harsher economic and diplomatic sanctions on the country. Iran thus began exceeding the terminated agreement’s acceptable amount of stockpiled enriched uranium, as well as its level of uranium enrichment. The escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran turned into a full-on conflict in January 2020 with the U.S. army’s assassination of Qasem Soleimani,the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Iran responded by targeting U.S. forces in Iraq, seizing Western commercial ships in the area, destroying infrastructure in rival Gulf states allied with the U.S., supporting military groups in the region, and violating some key agreements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This demonstrated Iran’s strong capabilities in hurting the interests of the U.S. and its allies. Even though Iran suffered greatly from the COVID-19 pandemic, it continued supporting its military and economic agents worldwide by offering material and moral help, despite the United States’ clear disapproval and opposition. Several European leaders attempted to encourage resolution through dialogue  throughout Trump’s presidency but to no avail; both sides were unwilling to compromise, especially after Soleimani’s assassination. In February 2021, Iran suspended the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensured the presence of nuclear inspectors to monitor Iran’s nuclear plans. This move intensified tensions not only with American leaders, but also with European states wary of Iran’s growing nuclear power. 

This modern rivalry ended up severely affecting Middle Eastern states; some would view the new status-quo negatively while others would perceive it positively. Focusing first on domestic impacts in Iran, both Western and Asian companies had no choice but to halt their Iranian operations. Although Iran stands amongst the largest oil producers in the region, the country struggled severely to find buyers. As a result, Iran’s economy suffered immensely, pushing Iranians to despair and heightening social and political pressures. Despite the nature of the repressive authoritative Iranian regime, the blame for the suffering of the masses was put on the U.S, increasing the power of hardliner politicians who ended up winning a majority in the parliamentary elections. They proceeded by not only demanding that the US lift sanctions, but also by requesting compensations for the incurred economic damages. 

These developments also significantly affected regional power dynamics. Partly driven by ethno-sectarian conflicts, Iran and Saudi Arabia have long battled for regional influence by conducting proxy wars (notably the Yemen and Syrian civil wars), supporting rival militant groups, and funding opposing political parties. Some scholars even argue that Iran’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has been more devastating to its standing than its relationship with the U.S.

 Ever since the complete termination of the nuclear deal by Trump, Iran’s regional rivals (Saudi Arabia in particular) have benefitted from Iran’s impoverishment and its lower international position. In fact, Trump also worked to create new alliances, notably between several Gulf states and Israel, to strengthen regional opposition towards Iranian power. However, due to the pandemic, the Gulf states are now facing budget constraints following declines in oil prices, which may inhibit their ability to invest in (and thereby stabilize) weaker Middle Eastern states like Egypt and Jordan. Iran, on the other hand, focused less on using wealth for regional influence in the past. Thus, Iran’s ideologic regional purposes will likely prosper regardless of its financial situation , pushing the U.S. to adopt a different strategy of “maximum pressure” and the Gulf states to re-evaluate their priorities (such as their willingness to battle Iranian power in Lebanon and Iraq). 

When Joe Biden took office in January 2021, U.S. foreign policy appeared to prioritize diplomacy, as Biden promised to re-enter the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran. However, this issue turned out to be more complex than expected. Some scholars still worry Biden will re-enter the deal quickly, perceiving his actions as another diplomatic success and thus wreaking havoc in the Middle East.

First and foremost, Middle Eastern dynamics have changed immensely since Biden was Vice-President during the Obama administration. If he decides to re-enter the JCPOA, he will now have to take into consideration local powers’ interests and opinions to avoid significant regional uproar. Scholars speculate that Israel and several Gulf states, which oppose the JCPOA altogether, may act together and turn to other superpowers such as China and Russia for support, and may attack Iranian nuclear facilities. On the other hand, if Biden decided to use his predecessor’s method of confrontation, he would have a strong coalition backed by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the UAE ready to support him. 

Indeed, scholars believe that not only powerful states will suffer from the U.S.’s return to the JCPOA, but weak ones as well. Iran has a long list of imperial projects in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq that aim to undermine their stability and thus to upend the U.S.’s security order in the region. By facilitating cash payments once again to the Iranian Islamic Republic, militant groups like the Hezbollah and Badr brigades will enjoy a financial, strategic, and morale boost at a time when their operational stability is weakening. This action will only further empower them and will once again increase their influence, dragging multiple other Middle Eastern states to despair. 

Despite previously signaling his willingness to re-enter the deal, Biden’s foreign policy approach towards the Middle East remains unclear. There is no doubt that his administration will need to take into consideration the changing landscape and dynamics of the Middle East, and will need to act in the interests of America’s newest Middle Eastern allies.