Armenia and Azerbaijan: The Powder Keg of the South Caucasus
In July 2020, the South Caucasus region, which has seen frequent clashes since the 1990s, experienced the most significant increase in tensions since 2016. Armenian and Azerbaijani troops clashed along their border, claiming at least 16 lives. On July 14th, around 50,000 Azerbaijanis protested in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, chanting slogans such as “death to the Armenians” and demanding the start of an all-out war against their neighbour. Response also came from Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described the skirmishes as an attack on Azerbaijan, expressing his support to his Azerbaijani ally İlham Aliyev. Although many fear the possibility of this incident sparking a larger conflict between the two wounded nations, others argue that the geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus, influenced by local rivalries and foreign motivations, would prevent the escalation of the present struggle. Rich in oil, at the crossroads of two mighty military and economic powers, the stakes seem too high for a war to erupt in this region. Therefore, does the Azerbaijani-Armenian struggle have the potential to escalate into a full-scale war?
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict centers around the mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 20th century, Armenians formed the majority of the population in this province located in the west of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, then part of the USSR. In 1988, as the Soviet Union crumbled, the region held a referendum, boycotted by its Azerbaijani population, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh’s declared independence and secession from Azerbaijan. Baku’s opposition and Armenia’s approval of this move led to fierce fighting between the two states in 1992. The war ended two years later with an Armenian victory, ensuring the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh and resulting in Armenia taking control of 9% of the Azerbaijani territory. As of today, Nagorno-Karabakh remains a de factoindependent state, despite its heavy reliance on Armenia for its currency, state bank, trade relations, and financial aid. Currently, Armenia aims to maintain its gains in the region and ensure the territorial integrity of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, however, seeks to reassert its control over the lost territories and wishes to re-annex Nagorno-Karabakh.
Although the conflict seems localized, the power vacuum created in the region paved the way for the intervention of foreign powers, deeply influencing the evolution of the conflict. With their geopolitical importance and advanced military power, Turkey and Russia’s interventions deeply influenced the trajectory of the conflict.
Russia has always maintained a notable presence in the South Caucasus, considering the region as its privileged zone of influence due to its status as an ex-part of the Soviet Union. Armenia-Russia relations strengthened with Armenia’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance regrouping most of the Post-Soviet states. Armenia now benefits from Russia's military protection, with a Russian military base on its soil. Part of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), an economic partnership that defines Russia’s sphere of economic domination, Armenia holds strong economic relations with Russia. The Russian Federation itself constitutes 27% of Armenia’s exports and 26% of its imports, making it a vital trading partner— one to keep good relations with.
Turkey, on the other hand, aligns closely with Azerbaijan. In an interview, Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies of Armenia, asserts that cultural reasons and economic benefits motivate this alliance. According to him, no one in Armenia has forgotten the Armenian genocide of 1915, and Turkey’s denial of the Ottoman Empire’s responsibility in the event sustains tensions between the two neighbours. This cultural adversity led Turkey to develop closer ties with Azerbaijan, a population partially of Turkish descent, to assert its presence in the region. Trade flourishes between the two states, with Turkey as Azerbaijan’s second-largest partner for both imports and exports. Most importantly, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan gas pipeline connecting the two states created a lucrative opportunity for Azerbaijan to sell its plentiful oil reserves to its partner. This pipeline, linking the Azeri capital to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, passes through the north of the Caucasus region, into Georgia; a way to bypass the Armenian rival. All these factors, coupled with Erdogan’s will to extend Turkish influence at its eastern frontier, has led Turkey to act against Armenia by closing its border in 1993; a move that Dr. Poghosyan calls the “Armenian Blockade.”
Turkey’s alliance with Azerbaijan and Russia’s support for Armenia indicates the polarized nature of the Armenian-Azerbaijani face-off and its potential to further destabilize the region. However, Dr. Poghosyan highlights the complex nature of the situation, as the ever-evolving relations between Turkey and Russia could potentially lead to a more peaceful outcome.
Russo-Turkish relations have always been volatile, experiencing ups and downs as international events unfold. The dissolution of the USSR led to closer ties between both states, but the shooting down of a Russian military jet by Turkish forces in 2015 placed a heavy strain on this developing relationship. However, increasing economic ties between both countries led to better terms in 2016, culminating with the construction of the “TurkStream”, a gas pipeline linking both countries via the Black Sea. Turkey now depends on its Russian partner for 30% of its oil supply, and maintaining good relations is paramount for the economic stability of both states. In terms of global strategy, Turkey and Russia still oppose each other on several battlefields: in Syria, and more recently in Libya, Putin and Erdoğan support different factions and conduct indirect wars to gain a local strategic advantage. This shows similarities to the situation in the South Caucasus, where both states support rival parties. Interestingly, this rivalry does not seem to affect the interest in bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Russia, in matters such as the management of the Black Sea. According to Dr. Poghosyan, this cooperative and competitive relationship could prove beneficial for the South Caucasus: “In the South Caucasus, I believe that both (countries) understand that strategically, they are rivals, but I don’t exclude that they may seek to launch something like Astana II”, referring to the peace talks of Astana I between Russia, Turkey and Iran over the Syrian conflict. The Russian and Turkish influence would thus increase the likelihood of peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an ideal solution to resolve this 30-year-old conflict. The current Russo-Turkish relations would also make a Turkish military intervention in Armenia very unlikely, as Armenia’s membership in the CSTO and status as a Russian ally would make Turkey reluctant to attack.
Upholding its claims as the sole protector of the region, Russia’s warming relations with Azerbaijan further promotes peace and stability in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan acts as a bridge between Russia and Iran, and it has a strategic position for Putin’s foreign policy actions in the Middle East. This strategic importance is coupled with good economic relations: Russia accounts for 16% of Azerbaijan’s imports, making it the country’s largest exporter, even more than Turkey. Most interestingly, however, bilateral relations have been marked by important sales of Russian weapons to the Azeri army. These sales, amounting to five billion dollars, are welcomed by the Azeri government, and will likely continue despite Armenia’s protests. According to Dr. Poghosyan, the Kremlin uses arm trading as a political strategy to keep a certain degree of influence over its partners. As long as Russia supplies Azerbaijan with weapons, the Azeri government will keep Russian interests in mind when it comes to foreign policy.
In the context of the region's historical tensions and the involvement of powerful allies, some fear that the South Caucasus has turned into a powder keg, ready to blow up with a single spark. This powder keg, however, is not expected to explode any time soon as Russia and Turkey’s particular relations, along with Kremlin’s will to protect the region as its sphere of influence will not allow further escalation of the conflict. With that being said, Armenian-Azerbaijani bargains will continue to be subsidiary in deciding the fate of the region insofar as Russia and Turkey maintain their seats at the table.